#ON1 RESIZE 2019.6 PASSWORD#
The only alternative to delivered key would be to addĪ password for the Relay Program.
#ON1 RESIZE 2019.6 SERIAL#
Protect any key delivered via the serial interface as malicious program might reserve The protection provided by the buffer_key is mediocre at best: it's not possible to Sub-directory is a keyed BLAKE2b digest of the Onion Address. The Relay Program creates a sub-directory for said contact. To store the information about to which contact a buffered ciphertext is intended, The cipher used for encrypting the persistent The key is static to allow cross-sessionĭecryption of buffered data. It is used as the symmetric key for additional layer of encryption added The buffered data is protected by a new key called the buffer_key which isĪ domain separated value of the TFC Onion Service private key. Installation) is lost in the void once the Networked Computer is rebooted. Is not enabled, the $HOME/Persistence/ directory (along with the TFC $HOME/Persistent/tfc instead of $HOME/tfc. When running on top of Tails, the Relay Program now stores all user data under This even applies to Tails if the user has enabled persistence: Messages/files are delivered to the recipient the next time both users Message sent by the user would be lost in the void, if the user also Previously if the Relay Program of the contact went offline, any The Relay Program now caches outgoing packets on disk (under $HOME/tfc)įrom where they are loaded by Flask when correct URL token is provided. Release breaks something, TFC's installer will be fixed on the April's maintenance update. Added support for Python 3.9 and the upcoming *buntu 21.04 releases: TFC installs on current Ubuntu 21.04 daily build, but if the final.
#ON1 RESIZE 2019.6 VERIFICATION#
Also, in digital signatures the decryption key is the public signature verification key anyway, so timing attacks against the decryption operation (=obtaining authentic copy of the installer's hash) on user-side, doesn't give the attacker any kind of advantage. The signing is done via gpg, which does not use pyca/cryptography. TFC only uses RSA for digital signature of the installer. TFC uses different library ( pyca/pynacl) for that.ĬVE-2020-28493 is a DoS vulnerability that affects the urlize function of Jinja2 v2.11.2, which TFC does not use Relay Program's Flask server does not render clickable links to the user.ĬVE-2020-25659 is a Bleichenbacher timing attack against RSA in pyca/cryptography PKCS#1.5 RSA implementations. This vulnerability does not concern TFC as pyca/cryptography is not used to encrypt data symmetrically in TFC. that match supported Python3 minor versions.ĬVE-2020-36242 which is a buffer overflow error when encrypting large files with pyca/cryptography's fernet module. Redesigned release pipeline to allow pinned dependency versions, and replacedĬoarse requirements hash pinning with automated hash pinning of all wheelsĮtc. Requests client connects to Onion Services. This does not concern TFC users as Tor manages the TLS-like encryption when
Unencrypted (but authenticated) anonymous installation of apt dependencies is This does not concern TFC users as no commit based pinned dependencies are used, only releases. PIP #9827 - Don't split git references on unicode separators which is a CVE numberless vulnerability that allowed hijack of commit based pinned dependencies. backports.entry-points-selectable 1.1.0.virtualenv to 20.5.0 (with following new sub-dependencies).charset-normalizer 2.0.1 that replaces chardet sub-dependency.requests to 2.26.0 (this finally resolves the pinned idna version).mypy to 0.910 (with following new sub-dependencies).Improved release pipeline to better detect hash mismatches.
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